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THE UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 341 AND MINING CORPORATIONS
D. CHARLES HAIR*
INTRODUCTION
The application of the collapsible corporation provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code' to mining corporations is an example of a failure to fully
allow for the inherent differences between mining operations and other kinds
of business ventures. As has been noted elsewhere, 2 the strict application of
section 341 to mining corporations will often have the unfortunate result of
causing such corporations to be treated as collapsible even though the abuses
at which section 341 is directed are not present. This problem was recog-
nized by Congress 3 and remedied to some extent with the enactment of the
escape provisions of section 341(e). The problem, however, still exists.
The purposes of this article will be to describe generally the application
of section 341 to mining corporations, and to provide guidance in dealing
with section 341 problems. It should be noted that there has not been much
of a history involving this problem, so there are often no definitive interpre-
tational answers. A probable reason for the lack of decisions in this area is
that mining ventures are not often incorporated. The individuals involved
are likely to be more interested in taking individual advantage of items such
as exploration and development expenditure deductions and depletion al-
lowances than they are in such corporate advantages as flexibility, limited
liability, and free transferability. Consideration of possible section 341
problems themselves may be still another strong factor discouraging the use
of corporations.
Nonetheless, there will be situations calling for the use of corporations,
and at such times the tax advisor must carefully consider the possible impact
of section 341.
I. THE COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION ABUSE
The abuse at which section 341 is directed can be illustrated as follows.
Some individuals purchase undeveloped real estate for $100,000, and they
put the real estate into a real estate development corporation in return for
the corporation's stock. Next, the real estate is subdivided and fully devel-
oped. As developed, the real estate now has a fair market value of
* Associate, Younge & Hockensmith, Grand Junction, Colorado; B.A., George Washing-
ton University; M.A., J.D., University of Michigan; M.L.T., Georgetown University.
I. I.R.C. § 341. All references to regulations are to the Income Tax Regulations.
2. See Hambrick, Collapsible Corporations : Oil and Gas: Does the /958 Act Affbrd Any Relief?,
28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 815 (1960); Cruickshank & Tomlin, 108-2d T.M., Oil and Gas Transac-
tions and Subchapter C (1950), at A-44 ff.
3. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1958).
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$1,000,000. If the corporation proceeds to sell lots, the corporation will be
taxed on its income from the sales at ordinary income tax rates.4 Subse-
quent distributions of income to the individuals will be taxed a second time
as dividends or salary. Even if the shareholders individually develop and sell
lots, their gains will be ordinary income.
5
To avoid both the ordinary income tax rates and the double taxation
possibility, in the absence of section 341, the corporation might liquidate by
distributing the real estate to the individuals in return for their stock. As-
suming the corporation has been in existence for twelve months, the individ-
uals now have a long-term capital gain of $900,000 under section 331 (a)(1).
They also obtain a basis in the real estate of the full $1,000,000, so that when
they sell the lots they will not have any additional income unless the sales
bring in more than $1,000,000. In effect, these individuals have converted
what would have been a large amount of ordinary income into long-term
capital gains.
To eliminate this conversion possibility, section 341 was enacted. In the
above example, section 341 would have the effect of causing the $900,000
gain on the liquidation to be treated as ordinary income.6 Thus, section 341
clearly eliminates the abuses at which it was aimed. As will be seen from the
discussion below, however, section 341 has such wide applicability that it
operates more as a bludgeon than as a scalpel.
II. GENERAL APPLICABILITY To MINING CORPORATIONS
Basically, section 341 sets forth fairly complicated rules for determining
when a corporation is "collapsible," and provides that shareholder gains
from disposing of their interests in a collapsible corporation will be treated as
ordinary income regardless of the capital gain treatment that would other-
wise be available. Because of the broad coverage of the basic definition of
"collapsible corporation," Congress has provided a number of possible es-
cape routes in section 341. It is the escape routes that create most of section
341's complexity, but without the escapes the scope of section 341 would
probably be intolerable.
To make the following discussion more concrete, assume the following
hypothetical fact situation. A has purchased a working interest entitling him
to three-fourths of all the uranium extracted from Tract X. B holds the
remaining one-fourth interest. Tract X is completely unexplored and unde-
veloped. To obtain funds for mining the uranium they expect to find, A and
B form the Uranium Mining Corporation (Uranium), which will issue 100
shares of stock. A takes 45 shares in return for his interest, while B takes 15
shares. The remaining 40 shares are sold for $1,000 per share to C (20
shares), D (15 shares), and E (5 shares). A, B, C, D, and E are all individu-
als. Rich uranium deposits are located, development is completed, and ura-
4. The lots would be "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business" under either I.R.C. § 1221(1) or § 123 1(b)(1)(B), so
that the corporation is a "dealer."
5. I.R.C. §§ 1221(1), 1231(b)(1)(B).
6. Id. § 341(a)(2).
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nium is now being produced. The Giant Uranium Mining Corporation
(Giant) now comes along and offers to buy out Uranium's shareholders at a
breathtaking profit.
Assuming that none of the shareholders are dealers in uranium leases,
there does not appear to be any reason why these shareholders should be
denied capital gains treatment in this situation. If any of them had individ-
ually owned for twelve months, developed, and then sold the Tract X lease,
they would clearly have been entitled to treat any gain as long-term capital
gain. Thus, there would be no abuse in allowing the shareholders capital
gain treatment on a sale of their stock or in a liquidation.
Section 341, however, is applied literally regardless of whether there is
any apparent abuse. It has been specifically held to apply to situations, such
as that described above, in which the shareholders would have had capital
gains treatment if they had not incorporated. 7 In effect, then, a provision
intended to prevent turning ordinary income into capital gains can come full
circle and turn capital gains into ordinary income.
In analyzing whether section 341 applies to Uranium it becomes appar-
ent that section 341 will apply to most mining corporations in which the
shareholders are contemplating selling out. Section 341 (b)(1) defines "col-
lapsible corporation" as "a corporation formed or availed of principally for
the manufacture, construction, or production of property, for the purchase
of [section 341 assets], or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed
or availed of, with a view to [collapsing the corporation]." Collapsing the
corporation basically consists of a disposition of stock by shareholders before
the corporation realizes "a substantial part of the taxable income to be de-
rived from such property."8 At first blush this definition may appear to be
quite broad. It is.
The phrase "formed or availed of" indicates that collapsibility does not
depend on having had the proscribed purposes at the inception of the corpo-
ration. It is sufficient if the corporation is "availed of" at any time for those
purposes. The fact that a corporation might have been formed with no in-
tention of constructing or producing property will not affect the determina-
tion of whether it is later "availed of" for such purposes.
9
"Principally" has been held to modify "the manufacture, etc." 10 At the
same time, "manufacture, etc." can be interpreted to apply to nearly any
kind of corporate activity. To make the definition even more all-inclusive,
section 341 (b) (2) (A) provides that a corporation is deemed to have manufac-
tured, etc., property if "it engaged in the manufacture, construction, or pro-
7. Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963).
8. It should be noted that this discussion is not intended to exhaustively analyze § 341.
Therefore, in some cases generalizations are made, and in some cases certain of the rules of
§ 341 are not discussed at all. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 64-994 § 212(a), 64 Stat.
935 (1950).
9. See Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1958); H. REP. No. 2319, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1950).
10. Set Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960); Burge v. Commissioner, 253
F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958); Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
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duction of such property to any extent."'
Has Uranium principally engaged in any of these activities? The answer
to this question illustrates the difficulty in applying section 341 to mining
corporations. Such corporations ordinarily do not manufacture anything,
but what about construction or production? The Internal Revenue Service
has ruled that drilling dry holes or conducting unsuccessful exploration ac-
tivities do not constitute "construction or production."1
2 The negative impli-
cation of this ruling is that successful exploration and development activities
do constitute "construction or production."' 13 As a result, it appears that
Uranium had engaged in construction or production as soon as any of its
exploration activities revealed the existence of recoverable uranium ore.
This analysis raises a few questions in the mining area. The first ques-
tion involves the fact that section 341 refers to the construction or produc-
tion of "property." In the usual case it will be fairly clear whether any
"property" is being constructed. For instance, in the example of the real
estate developer used above it is clear that once lots have been developed or
houses have been built on the lots, "property" has been constructed. Sup-
pose, however, that the Uranium shareholders sold out the corporation after
successful exploration but before any development. Where is the "property"
that has been constructed or produced? To find that property has been con-
structed or produced the argument must be that because successful explora-
tion activities necessarily increase the value of the relevant mineral interests,
there must be some kind of "property" representing the increased value.
Surely this is a case of the tail wagging the dog.
The second problem involves the question of whether the production of
minerals should be treated as section 341 "production." Looking at the clas-
sic section 341 abuse in which ordinary income is converted into capital
gains, it does not appear that such an abuse would normally occur in a min-
ing corporation. In Uranium's case, any uranium recovered has most likely
been sold and the twenty-two percent depletion allowance claimed. When
Uranium is sold out, therefore, there will be no conversion of ordinary in-
come unless there has been an intentional stockpiling of recovered ore.
Moreover, an Internal Revenue Service ruling 14 suggests that the recovery of
minerals will not be treated as "production" since that ruling holds that con-
struction or production are completed once a producing well is completed.
The problem becomes more complex if the mining corporation engages
in processing or refining the extracted minerals prior to sale. In theory, it
can be argued that extraction itself is not "production" because the minerals
being extracted are already in existence. Further processing, however, raises
the question of whether something new is not manufactured or produced at
some point. Again, it is likely that even if there is further processing, any ore
11. Emphasis supplied.
12. Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 C.B. 131.
13. Rev. Rul. 57-346, 1957-2 C.B. 236, specifically holds that the drilling and equipping of
wells constitutes construction or production under § 341.
14. Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 C.B. 131.
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extracted and processed will be sold rather than stockpiled so that there will
not be an intent to convert ordinary income into capital gains.
Despite these underlying problems of logic or policy, it is relatively clear
that Uranium will be treated as a corporation formed or availed of princi-
pally for the construction or production of property. Thus, we come to the
final definitional question which is whether there is a "view" to collapse the
corporation before a substantial part of the income is realized. Here again
the test is difficult to avoid. In almost any case where a corporation is sold or
liquidated before it has realized a substantial part of the income from its
property, the "view" can and will be found to exist.' 5 The key in most situa-
tions lies in showing that a substantial part of the income has been realized,
since where there has not been such substantial realization there tends to be
a presumption that there was a "view."'
16
When is a substantial part of the income from the property realized? It
is generally accepted that realization of at least one-third of the total income
to be realized is "substantial."' 17 Where mining corporations are concerned,
the problem is to determine what is meant by the "income to be derived
from such property." This determination is relatively easy in the case of a
housing project in which it can be assumed that once one-third of the houses
are sold, one-third of the total possible income has been realized.
In Uranium's case, however, the first theoretical problem to resolve is to
determine what the relevant income is. In the real estate example, the rele-
vant income is clearly the income from the sale of improved lots, where the
improved lots are the property that was constructed or produced. Where a
mining corporation is concerned, it is not entirely clear what the property
constructed or produced is, but it is clear that the income to be derived from
such property cannot be anticipated income from the sale of the leases them-
selves.
Evidently the relevant income must be the anticipated income from the
sale of minerals, even though the minerals are arguably not the section 341
"property" that was constructed or produced so that arguably such income
is not "derived from such property." Uranium, then, would need to estimate
the projected amount of extractable ore in order to determine whether one-
third of the income from such ore has already been realized. This required
estimate would usually not pose a great problem since Uranium would al-
ready need to have made such an estimate for purposes of computing its
possible cost depletion.
A further problem may arise out of an argument raised by the Service
in the case of Honaker Drg., Inc. v. Koehler. I In that case, the Internal Reve-
nue Service argued that items that had been expensed in advance 19 should
be subtracted from income received in determining the percentage of total
15. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 12-14, 12-15 (4th ed. 1979) (discussion of when the "view" can be avoided).
16. Id.
17. Rev. Rul. 72-48, 1972-I C.B. 102.
18. 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
19. An example of such items would be intangible drilling costs which the corporation
elected to deduct currently.
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expected income that had been realized. 20 Although this theory was rejected
in Honaker, the Service may not have abandoned it.
A policy-oriented objection can be raised with regard to treating poten-
tial income from mineral sales as the income "derived from such property."
If the idea of section 341 is to prevent revenue losses resulting from conver-
sion of ordinary income into capital gains, the objection in the mining area is
that in many cases there would be no revenue loss even without the applica-
tion of section 341. In Uranium's case, if the shareholders sell their shares to
Giant and can treat the gains as a capital gain they must then pay taxes at
capital gains rates. The income "derived from such property" is still going to
be derived and taxed as it would have been, except that now Giant is the
taxpayer. The only way for a revenue loss to result is for Giant's available
cost depletion to exceed percentage depletion, because cost depletion is only
available to the extent of basis and Giant may be able to obtain a greater
basis than Uranium had in the leasehold. 2 1 Percentage depletion, however,
is available without regard to basis, and in many, if not most, cases percent-
age depletion will exceed cost depletion.
Nonetheless, it appears from this analysis that Uranium, and many
mining corporations, will fall under the section 341 definition of "collapsible
corporation." Thus, Uranium was (1) formed or availed of, (2) principally
to construct and produce property, (3) with a view, (4) to collapse before a
substantial part of the income from such property has been realized.
In addition to the factors discussed above, there is an excellent chance
that Uranium is subject to section 341(c), which simply establishes a rebutta-
ble presumption of collapsible status.22 The presumption applies if (1) the
fair market value of a corporation's section 341 assets equals or exceeds fifty
percent of the fair market value of all of its assets, and (2) the fair market
value of the section 341 assets also equals or exceeds 120% of the adjusted
basis of such section 341 assets.2 3 "Section 341 assets" are defined in section
341(b)(3) to include any property held for sale 24 and most property de-
scribed by section 1231(b) where such property has been held for a period of
less than three years.25 Section 1231(b) defines "property used in a trade or
business" and would include items such as the leasehold interests A and B
put into Uranium.
2 6
The reason this presumption probably applies to Uranium can be illus-
trated with the following example. Assume that the leasehold interests put
20. Honaker Drlg., Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
21. Giant could obtain a greater basis through application of § 342(b)(2) or by buying
Uranium's assets outright, with the Uranium shareholders utilizing a § 337 liquidation. See
I.R.C. § 611 and appropriate regulations.
22. BIT-rKER & EUsTICE, supra note 15, at 12-17. "The theory of the rebuttable presump-
tion is that if the 'section 341 assets' are substantial in amount and have risen significantly in
value above their basis, it is reasonable to place the burden of disproving collapsability on the
taxpayer."
23. I.R.C. § 341(c)(A), (B).
24. "[P]roperty held by the corporation for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its
trade or business." Id. § 341(b)(3)(B).
25. Id. § 1231(b). References to § 1231(b) property are used interchangeably with refer-
ences to property used in a trade or business.
26. We must again assume that Uranium is not a dealer in such interests.
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into Uranium by A and B had a combined basis to A and B of $60,000 when
they exchanged those interests for Uranium stock, and that section 351 ap-
plied to the exchange.2 7 Because of section 351, neither A and B nor Ura-
nium recognized any gain or loss on the exchange, and Uranium's basis in
the leasehold is $60,000. Next, assume that the fair market value of the
leasehold is $200,000 when Giant offers to buy Uranium out. Uranium's
non-section 341 assets (mining equipment, 2a and so forth) have a fair mar-
ket value of $200,000. The section 341(c) presumption applies because (1)
the fair market value of Uranium's section 341 assets ($200,000) equals fifty
percent of the fair market value of its total assets ($400,000), and (2) the fair
market value of the section 341 assets ($200,000) also exceeds 120% of its
adjusted basis in such assets ($60,000).29
It is submitted that these tests will often be met by mining corporations.
Indeed, the above example simply shows what can happen where the fair
market value of a leasehold rises sharply as is likely to happen once successful
exploration has occurred. Two other typical occurrences will also tend to
cause the presumption to apply. One occurrence is the use of depletion al-
lowances which will cause a decrease in the adjusted basis of the leasehold.
30
The second occurrence is the extraction of ore which will have a zero basis to
the corporation, and which will also be a section 341 asset.
31
From the above discussion, it may appear that a mining corporation is
doomed to collapsible corporation treatment. Fortunately, however, section
341 provides a number of exceptions to collapsible corporation treatment.
III. SECTION 341(d) EXCEPTIONS
Section 341 generally does not apply to a shareholder who owns five
percent or less of the outstanding stock of the corporation. 32 To meet this
exception the shareholder must not have owned more than five percent of
the stock at the time the construction or production began or at any time
thereafter. 33 In addition, the exception will not apply if the shareholder's
holdings can be attributed to another shareholder under the constructive
ownership rules applicable under section 341(d). 34 In our basic example,
only E will benefit from this exception, and even E will not benefit if E is
related to one of the other shareholders in such a way as to cause attribution
of ownership.
Section 341 also does not apply unless more than seventy percent of the
27. I.R.C. § 351. This section provides for the nonrecognition of gains or losses when prop-
erty is transferred to a corporation in exchange for securities in situations where the transferor
controls the corporation.
28. We must now assume that the mining equipment would be treated under I.R.C.
§ 341(b)(3)(D) as property described in § 1231(b), since the equipment is used to produce ura-
nium ore. Of course, a similar argument can be made for not classifying the lease itself as a
§ 341 asset.
29. I.R.C. § 341(c)(A), (B).
30. Id. § 1016(a)(2).
31. /d. § 341(b)(3).





recognized gain during a taxable year is attributable to property that was
constructed or produced. 35 This exception is not likely to help in our exam-
ple because virtually all of the gain to be recognized will be attributable to
the constructed or produced property.
Finally, section 341(d)(3) provides that section 341 does not apply to
gains realized more than three years after the completion of the construction
or production. This exception is also likely to have little usefulness for the
mining corporation. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that construc-
tion or production is completed once the developmental phase is done.
36
There can be, however, problems in determining when development ends
and production begins. Moreover, the typical mining corporation will be
involved in a number of interests such that development on some interests is
continually taking place.
IV. SECTION 341(e)
The greatest potential for Uranium's escape from section 341 treatment
is found in section 341 (e). If the conditions of section 341 (e) are met then the
following four avenues of escape from collapsible corporation treatment are
available:
1. The shareholders can sell their stock and be taxed at capital
gains rates.
2. The corporation will be eligible for nonrecognition of gain
treatment under the twelve-month liquidation provisions of section
337.
3. The corporation can be liquidated with the shareholders' gains
taxed at capital gains rates.
4. The shareholders can make use of the nonrecognition of gain
treatment allowed for thirty-day liquidations under section 333.37
To determine whether the subsection (e) exceptions apply, it is neces-
sary to go through some complex analysis. First, it must be determined
whether the corporation in question has any "subsection (e) assets" as de-
fined by section 341(e)(5). Generally, the presence of subsection (e) assets
will reduce the possibility of obtaining relief under section 341(e). It should
be noted that constructive ownership rules apply throughout subsection (e)
in determining percentage of ownership.
The first kind of subsection (e) asset consists basically of property, not
used in the trade or business, which could not be sold at capital gains rates
either by the corporation or by a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder. 38
This category will primarily include inventory and items held for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. The key point is that to classify
an item properly one must look both to the item's status in the hands of the
corporation and to the item's status in the hands of all more-than-twenty-
35. Id. § 341(d)(2).
36. Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 C.B. 131.
37. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 15, at 12-22.
38. I.R.C. § 341(e)(5)(A)(i).
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percent shareholders. 39 In the example of the real estate development, the
improved lots would fall under this category because the corporation is hold-
ing the lots for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
This category of subsection (e) assets will be one of two key categories
for Uranium and other mining corporations. Clearly, Uranium's major asset
is its leasehold interest in Tract X. To determine if that leasehold is a first
category subsection (e) asset we must determine whether Uranium is a
dealer40 in uranium leases and whether the lease is used in Uranium's trade
or business. Uranium is not likely to be classified as a dealer where it has
never sold uranium leases before. Further, Uranium is in the business of
exploring, developing, and extracting minerals; so that the uranium lease is
clearly used in Uranium's business.
Another question would be involved if Uranium held nonworking min-
eral interests. Strictly speaking, such interests are not used in Uranium's
trade or business since Uranium would take no part in exploring, develop-
ing, or mining such interests other than by investing cash. These interests
would nonetheless be capital assets held for investment to Uranium, so long
as Uranium is not a dealer. At this point, however, we need to examine
whether any more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such inter-
ests. If so, these interests are subsection (e) assets even though the corpora-
tion would be entitled to capital gains treatment on their sale.
4 1
As will be seen in the discussion below, the question of dealer status is
often crucial in determining the applicability of subsection (e).4 2 Most fre-
quently the key to resolving dealer status has been to look to the number and
frequency of prior sales. In the case of Uranium and A, we would look then
to their prior histories of sales of nonworking mineral interests. Uranium has
no prior history and is therefore unlikely to be classified as a dealer. Sup-
pose, however, that 4 has an extensive background of investing in and dis-
posing of mineral interests. Now there is a dealer problem, even though in
some cases there probably should not be.
43
The problem arises because of the number of sales A has made. If we
assume, however, that A is in the business of exploring for minerals and
developing mineral interests, it can be expected that A will have bought and
sold numerous interests. This situation differs from the real estate develop-
ment example, because there the whole idea of development is to make lots
salable while here the idea of development is to facilitate ore extraction, A
may have had any number of reasons for prior sales such as the need for
capital to develop retained interests, an inability to finance further opera-
tions, or an unsolicited offer so large he felt compelled to accept. Thus, the
39. Goldstein, Section 341(d) and (e)-A journey Into Never-Never Land, 10 VILL. L. REV. 215,
245 (1965).
40. The term "dealer" is used to denote a person or corporation holding assets for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business.
41. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 245.
42. For a more detailed discussion of the dealer problem in the mineral area see Smith,
Dispositions of Oil and Gas Properties - Dealer vs. Investor, 1965 TUL. TAX INST. 485.




number of prior sales may not constitute sufficient evidence in itself for clas-
sifying A as a dealer.
44
Nonetheless, where A has had numerous prior sales it is probable that
the dealer question will be raised. If he is a dealer, then Uranium's non-
working mineral interest is a first category subsection (e) asset.
The second category of subsection (e) assets includes certain property
that is used in the trade or business. As noted above, "property used in the
trade or business" includes the uranium lease unless that lease is considered
held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business. This
property is a second category subsection (e) asset only if the unrealized de-
preciation on such property exceeds the unrealized appreciation on such
property; or in other words, if there is a net unrealized depreciation. 45 This
situation is unlikely to arise in the mining corporation.
Under the third category, if there is net unrealized appreciation in all
property used in the trade or business, then any such property will be consid-
ered a subsection (e) asset to the extent that any such property would not be
a capital or section 1231 (b) asset in the hands of a more-than-twenty-percent
shareholder. 46 This category is the second key category for most mining cor-
porations.
As discussed above, Uranium's uranium lease was not picked up under
the first category of subsection (e) assets where (1) the lease is used in Ura-
nium's business and (2) Uranium is not a dealer in such leases, even if (3) a
more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such leases. Under the
third category, however, the lease can be a subsection (e) asset if a more-
than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such leases. To make the de-
termination, a calculation must be made of the total fair market value and
total basis of all assets used in the trade or business. If basis is exceeded by
fair market value then the third category applies, and every business asset
must be examined to see if any more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a
dealer in such assets. If so, then such assets are subsection (e) assets even if
the particular asset actually had a higher basis than fair market value.
4 7
As in the first category, it can be seen that the key question is likely to
be whether any more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in ura-
nium leases. Thus, it is probable that the fair market value of Uranium's
section 1231 (b) assets exceeds Uranium's basis in such assets because (1) Ura-
nium probably has a low basis as compared to fair market value in its ura-
nium lease, and (2) that lease is likely to represent the greatest part of
Uranium's section 1231(b) assets. The fourth category of subsection (e) as-
sets involves copyrights and the like,48 and is not relevant to this discussion.
The conclusion is that if the corporation, a more-than-twenty-percent
shareholder, or two related shareholders who together own more than
twenty percent of the stock, are dealers in mineral leases then the corpora-
44. This problem is specifically discussed by Smith, supra note 42.
45. I.R.C. § 341(e)(5)(A)(ii).
46. Id. § 341(e)(5)(A)(iii).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 341(e)(5)(A)(iv).
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tion's leases are subsection (e) assets. Because such leases are likely to be a
mining corporation's major assets, such classification may prevent the corpo-
ration from making use of the relief provisions of subsection (e).
Generally, no relief is available under subsection (e) unless the net un-
realized appreciation in the corporation's subsection (e) assets is less than
fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth.4 9 Thus, the problem of hav-
ing a mining corporation's mineral leases classified as subsection (e) assets
becomes apparent. Because the mineral leases are (1) likely to be the corpo-
ration's major assets and (2) likely to have greatly appreciated in value while
the basis has been greatly reduced, then classification as subsection (e) assets
makes it unlikely that subsection (e) relief can be obtained. Moreover, fur-
ther rules under subsection (e) can cause problems even where there are no
subsection (e) assets under the basic categories described above.
Section 341(e)(1) permits capital gains treatment on the sale of shares
by a shareholder. The principal additional rule introduced under section
341(e)(1) is that in addition to computing net unrealized appreciation on the
basic subsection (e) assets, if the shareholder in question is a more-than-five-
percent shareholder, it is also necessary to compute the net unrealized appre-
ciation on assets that would have been subsection (e) assets if that share-
holder had been a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder.
50
To explain, suppose that in the case of the Uranium Corporation
neither the corporation nor A is a dealer in mineral leases, and none of the
shareholders are related in a way that would bring the constructive owner-
ship rules into play. Suppose further that the net unrealized appreciation of
the uranium lease exceeds fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth.
From these facts the lease is not a subsection (e) asset because the corpora-
tion and its only more-than-twenty-percent shareholder are not dealers. On
a sale of shares, however, every more-than-five-percent shareholder, which
includes everyone except E, must separately compute the net unrealized ap-
preciation on subsection (e) assets as if such shareholder were a more-than-
twenty-percent shareholder. Thus, if any of them are dealers in mineral
leases, they will not be entitled to capital gains treatment on a sale of their
shares. This provision applies on an individual basis, so that it is possible for
some shareholders to obtain capital gains treatment while others cannot.
5 1
Corporations can make use of the nonrecognition of gain on sales of
property in a twelve-month liquidation 52 if the requirements of section
341 (e)(4) are met. The basic requirement is that the net unrealized appreci-
ation of the subsection (e) assets not exceed fifteen percent of net worth at
any time during the twelve-month period.53 Here we are not concerned
with anyone who is not a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder. This pro-
vision, however, only deals with the tax treatment of the corporation.
To determine the tax treatment of the shareholders on receipt of liqui-
49. Id. § 341(e)(I)(C).
50. Id.
51. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 234.
52. I.R.C. § 337.
53. Id. § 341(e)(4)(A), (B).
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dating distributions in a twelve-month liquidation, we need to examine sec-
tion 341(e)(2). Under section 341(e)(2) we must once again consider each
more-than-five-percent shareholder separately, and determine the net un-
realized appreciation of basic subsection (e) assets plus the net unrealized
appreciation of assets that would be subsection (e) assets if such shareholders
were more-than-twenty-percent shareholders. Those shareholders meeting
the fifteen-percent-of-net-worth test are entitled to capital gains treatment
on receipt of liquidating distributions. 4 Here again, it is possible for some
shareholders to obtain capital gains treatment on the liquidating distribu-
tions while others cannot.
Finally, section 341(e)(3) permits nonrecognition of gain treatment in
thirty-day liquidations pursuant to section 333. Again the basic condition for
such treatment is that the net unrealized appreciation of subsection (e) assets
not exceed fifteen percent of net worth. For purposes of this provision, how-
ever, "subsection (e) asset" is defined to include all assets that would be sub-
section (e) assets for more-than-five-percent shareholders. In other words,
here the basic definition of "subsection (e) asset" is broadened, and if one
shareholder cannot obtain nonrecognition treatment none of them can.
V. WHAT To Do
From the above analysis it is possible to reach the following generalized
conclusions:
1. A typical mining corporation is likely to come under the basic
section 341 definition of "collapsible corporation."
2. If a mining corporation is classified as a collapsible corpora-
tion, it must primarily look to subsection (e) for relief.
3. If the corporation or any of its more-than-twenty-percent
shareholders are dealers in mineral interests, subsection (e) relief is
probably unavailable.
4. If any more-than-five-percent shareholder is a dealer in min-
eral interests, subsection (e) relief is probably unavailable to that
shareholder and thirty-day liquidation treatment is probably un-
available to any shareholder.
5. Any corporation or shareholder that has engaged in a signifi-
cant number of mineral lease transactions must face the possibility
that the Service will want to treat them as dealers.
What do these conclusions suggest in terms of the proposed buy out of
Uranium by Giant?
First, Uranium ought to consider whether it can meet the subsection (e)
requirements. If so, it is irrelevant whether Uranium is a collapsible corpo-
ration or not so long as the buy out is structured either as a stock sale or as a
twelve-month liquidation in accordance with the section 341(e) rules.
The key question for this purpose will be to determine whether any of
the relevant parties are dealers in uranium leases. If no one has had a signifi-
cant number of prior dealings in such leases, no one should be classified as a
54. Note that this discussion only discusses the basic rules. Other requirements must be
met under both §§ 341(e)(2) and 341(e)(4).
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dealer. Unfortunately, it is the nature of a mining corporation that at least
some of the shareholders, and the corporation itself if the corporation has
been in existence a significant period of time, will have had a significant
number of prior dealings.
If a dealer problem is foreseen, the next step is to make the relevant
subsection (e) percentage calculations. Of course, in making the calculations
there is room for planning in setting the various fair market values and de-
termining net worth. Thus, the best evidence of fair market value of corpo-
rate assets will be the price assigned to the assets after negotiation between
buyer and seller. Where the seller is a corporation disposing of its assets in a
twelve-month liquidation, it is obviously to the shareholder's advantage to
have most of the purchase price allocated to assets that cannot be classified
as subsection (e) assets. Such an allocation serves to reduce the amount of
unrealized net appreciation on such assets.
If it is determined that the subsection (e) percentage tests cannot be
met, it is time to consider other defenses. The weight of such defenses must
then be compared to the risk that they will fail.
The most immediate defense will be that the relevant parties should not
be classified as dealers. As suggested above, this defense can be a strong one
because of analytical problems involved in applying normal "dealer" princi-
ples in the mineral area.
Beyond the dealer question, it will be necessary to go back to the other
section 341 exceptions and to the collapsible corporation definition to deter-
mine if there is another escape. As analyzed above, however, the other es-
capes will probably be of litle help.
What then can Uranium do if it makes the required analysis and deter-
mines that it cannot presently escape section 341 treatment?
1. It can cease all activity that might constitute construction or
production and wait three years to liquidate. This solution may be
unacceptable for a number of reasons.
2. It can continue to operate until one-third of the estimated ura-
nium ore on Tract X' has been extracted and sold, and then liqui-
date. This solution is more palatable although it means that
additional leases should not be acquired. Also, this plan will not
work well if additional ore deposits are located on Tract X. There
may even be a problem in determining when one-third of the in-
come has been recognized in light of the position taken by the Serv-
ice in Honaker Drlg.55
3. Uranium can go through a tax-free reorganization with Giant.
The drawback here is that Uranium's shareholders may not want
simply to trade their Uranium shares for Giant shares.
4. The corporation can make an election under section 341(f)
which would permit the shareholders to obtain capital gains treat-
ment on a sale of their shares. 56 There are two difficulties with this
approach. First, it is often difficult in general to convince a buyer
to buy stock rather than assets. Second, this difficulty is com-
55. 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
56. I.R.C. § 341(0(2).
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pounded by the fact that a 341 (f) election has been made, because
the election can cause detrimental tax treatment to the subsequent
buyer.
5 7
5. The shareholders can sell their shares under the installment
method. 58 In this way, if they are ultimately subjected to ordinary
income treatment, they will at least spread out such income. Here
again, however, it may be difficult to convince a buyer to buy
shares, especially since he may be buying a collapsible corporation.
There are some other possibilities, but these are the major ones. As indi-
cated, there are problems with all of the solutions such that once
shareholders find themselves in a collapsible corporation situation there sim-
ply may not be a satisfactory way out. It should be noted in this connection
that there is little hope of obtaining advance assurance through a private
letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service because it does not ordina-
rily issue rulings either as to collapsible corporation status or as to dealer
status.
59
This analysis leads to the most important point of all. There must be
sound planning at the outset to determine whether a corporation should be
used at all. If a partnership is used, there will obviously not be a collapsible
corporation problem. There will still be a dealer problem, but the dealer
problem is only exacerbated when combined with a collapsible corporation
problem. Thus, when the initial decision on whether to incorporate is made,
the possibility of section 341 treatment must be weighed.
Another possibility in early planning is to elect Subchapter S treat-
ment.6° This approach may be desirable because capital gains retain their
nature when passed through to Subchapter S corporation shareholders, and
section 341 does not apply to such gains. The reason early planning is called
for is that under section 1378 the capital gains pass-through benefit may be
severely restricted if a Subchapter S election has not been in effect for a
corporation's previous three taxable years. 6 1 It should be noted that the reg-
ulations indicate that the Service may not allow a capital gains pass-through
where a sale of the assets involved would generate ordinary income in the
hands of a substantial shareholder.6 2 This regulation's validity, however, is
at least open to question.
63
A final alternative where a corporation is otherwise desirable is to go
ahead and use a corporation to do the actual exploration, development, and
mining, but keep the mineral leases out of the corporation. In this way cor-
porate advantages such as limited liability can be utilized, while the major
assets that might trigger section 341 treatment are kept out of the corpora-
tion. Again, there will still be a dealer problem if the leases are sold, but the
problem will not involve section 341 at the same time.
57. Id.
58. I.R.C. § 453.
59. Rev. Proc. 80-22, 1980-26 I.R.B. 26.
60. See Boland, Collapsible Corporations Under the 1958 Amendment, 17 TAx L. REV. 203, 231
(1962).
61. I.R.C. § 1378(c)(1).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-1(d), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 C.B. 317.
63. See BITrKER & EUsTIcE, supra note 15, at 6-26 n.58.
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CONCLUSION
There are clearly both analytical and policy problems in applying sec-
tion 341 to mining corporations. Nonetheless, it appears to be well estab-
lished that section 341 will be applied to such corporations with the result of
severely discouraging the use of the corporate form in many mining opera-
tions. Where use of a corporation is desirable despite section 341 risks, the
best that can be done is to seek competent advance tax counseling and hope
that the Service will ultimately not see fit to invoke section 341.

